

EXPEDITIONARY WARRIOR



2009



Examining the sea base in support of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations



Expeditionary Warrior 2009

Quicklook Report

27 February 2009



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Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory



OVERVIEW

This Quicklook Report provides a brief, initial review of the lessons and insights developed during *Expeditionary Warrior 2009 (EW09)*, the latest iteration of the Marine Corps' Title 10 Wargaming Program. The final assessment will provide a more detailed discussion of the war game.

At the direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, the objectives of this year's *Expeditionary Warrior* were to examine the Seabasing concept in the context of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.

The event examined future capability in Foreign Internal Defense and Counterinsurgency in the face of challenges to access arising from geography, potential adversary capabilities and host nation concerns. These factors may inhibit access to potential air or sea ports of debarkation (APODs or SPODs) and other land and sea territory. Seabasing can also mitigate U.S. and partner nations' sentiment regarding troop presence overseas.

EW09 was conducted 2-6 February 2009 at the William F. Bolger Leadership Center in Potomac, Maryland. *EW09* was the culmination of six months of conferences, workshops, seminars and planning events. The game brought together nearly 200 individuals from diverse professional backgrounds to examine the Seabasing concept. Among the participants were all five branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, USSOCOM, USJFCOM, representatives from the U.S. Department of State, academia, think-tanks, and multinational partners including NATO Headquarters, Australia, Canada, Germany, France, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

GAME OBJECTIVES

1. Examine, in the context of the sea base supporting FID and COIN operations,
 - a. Capabilities needed to support required operations
 - b. Ship and connector mixes and C4ISR that support operational requirements
 - c. At-sea capabilities that can enable operations ashore
 - d. Activities conducted ashore that can be conducted at sea
 - e. Interoperability of sea-based platforms in joint and coalition operations
 - f. Relationship between supporting theater infrastructure and the sea base
2. Identify and assess capabilities required for joint, coalition, and host nations to plan and conduct FID and COIN operations. Specifically,
 - a. Capability sets for GPF and SOF to meet mission requirements
 - b. Ability to select the most appropriate direct and indirect approaches tailored to local conditions
 - c. Emerging non-traditional threats
 - d. Ability to operate in under-governed areas

3. Examine the central and supporting ideas of the FID-COIN JIC and evaluate proposed capability sets.

These objectives – using two globally disparate scenarios set between 2016 and 2028 in the Horn of Africa and Indonesia – were linked with the six Marine Corps Core Competencies identified by the Commandant in the milestone document, *USMC Vision and Strategy 2025*.

WHY SEABASING?

Seabasing Defined:

Seabasing – the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). These capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea. - Seabasing JIC v1.0

Seabasing is a concept that provides a solution to the challenge of conducting joint missions across a range of operations from the sea, across the littorals, and ashore. It provides for the application of capabilities by leveraging joint, interagency, and multinational efforts. Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) employing the Seabasing concept are better able to overcome many of the access challenges present in the current post-Cold War, post-9/11 security environment. These access challenges include:

1. The challenge posed by geography
2. The challenge associated with potential adversaries' capabilities
3. Host nation concerns which inhibit access to their APODs, SPODs and territory in the pursuit of action
4. Domestic U.S. and coalition political sentiment against large troop presence in non-permissive operating environments overseas.

Seabasing allows the U.S. and Coalition partners to optimize presence ashore while employing operational flexibility to achieve U.S. national goals by using the sea as maneuver space.

GAME OVERVIEW: METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

EW09 participants explored the concept of Seabasing in the context of FID and COIN operations.

FID and COIN defined:

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) – the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another

government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency. – JP 1-02

Counterinsurgency (COIN) – those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. – JP 1-02

EW09 was a seminar-style war game featuring two unconnected scenarios set in the Horn of Africa and Indonesia spanning the years 2016-2028, with varying degrees of threats, geographic challenges, operational environments, and multinational and host nation political sensitivities.

Six teams analyzed Seabasing as an enabling concept for FID-COIN operations.

- The first three teams focused on a regional FID-COIN campaign in the Horn of Africa. In this scenario, access was varied by the political sensitivities of the different nations in the region. This scenario began with a fully developed insurgency in place at the onset of the war game, and then transitioned to stabilization operations in later game moves.
- The next three teams examined a multinational approach to FID and COIN in Indonesia. In this scenario, access was varied over time due to changing host nation political sensitivities as the campaign progressed. Further complicating this scenario was the large geographic area of the Indonesian archipelago. In this scenario, the teams were initially focused on conflict prevention. In later game moves the situation escalates into insurgency.
- A seventh team leveraged the work done by the other six teams to refine the capabilities, tasks and attributes outlined in the FID-COIN JIC.

GAME SCENARIO OVERVIEW

HORN OF AFRICA:

The first scenario encompassed a regional insurgency located in the Horn of Africa (Figure 1.). The threat was based on a regional insurgent group known as al-Shabaab, operating primarily out of Somalia, but with spillover effects across the region. For the purposes of this war game HOA includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Somalia. The goals of al-Shabaab were to overthrow the government of Somalia and expand the borders to that of “Greater Somalia”, which includes large areas of Kenya and Ethiopia. Game players were challenged with a complicated geopolitical environment that included competing influences of transnational terrorists, warlords, pirates, and organized crime. Eritrea played the role of spoiler in this scenario; providing active support to the insurgency in order to antagonize their rival neighbor, Ethiopia. Access to the HOA in this scenario varied according to the political sensitivities of the different nations. Game players acted as a U.S. led multinational task force (MNTF) with the mission to prevent the overthrow of the government, improve governance, eliminate terrorist safe havens, and improve regional stability.



Figure 1. HOA Areas Controlled by al-Shabaab 2016

The HOA teams employed Seabasing as an operational enabler to achieve the following:

- Overcoming access challenges due to political sensitivities
- Flexible response to the various regional basing and overflight stipulations
- Scalable logistics, FID, COIN, combat operations, and direct action
- MNTF C4ISR
- Supported Maritime Security/Anti-Piracy Operations prosecuted by allied naval assets
- Conducted amphibious demonstration to deter Eritrean aggression

INDONESIA:

The second scenario encompassed two insurgencies in Indonesia, located in the provinces of Aceh and Papua. In contrast to the HOA scenario, these insurgencies did not aim to overthrow the government. Their goals were to gain and maintain local autonomy due to discontent with the government of Indonesia; specifically, resource draining economic legislation that crippled the local economies of Aceh and Papua. In 2013, the military wing of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was formally reactivated. In addition to Indonesian forces, the GAM targeted western business interests in Aceh. By 2017, radical segments of the separatist movement united in Papua to establish the West Papua Liberation Organization (WPLO) which sought to achieve independence through an active and prolonged insurgency against the Indonesian government. The access challenges in this scenario were geographic and political. Indonesia is an archipelago of over 17,000 islands and the two affected provinces in this scenario were separated by over 3,000 miles. (Figure 2.) There were also substantial political restrictions that limited force levels and basing. The U.S. mission was to support the government of Indonesia's actions to defeat insurgent and terrorist groups in collaboration with other U.S. government agency and international partner efforts.



Figure 2. EW 09 Indonesia

The Indonesia teams employed Seabasing as an operational enabler to achieve the following:

- Overcoming access challenges: geographic and political
- Flexibility of the sea base allowed forces to divide to prosecute simultaneous missions in widely separated provinces within the Indonesian AO
 - Advance bases in Singapore and Darwin facilitated inter-theater logistic support
- Flexible response to basing and overflight restrictions and troop limits
- Implementation of Indonesia's IDAD and counterinsurgency efforts
- Scalable logistics, FID, COIN, combat operations, and direct action
- Maritime Security/Anti-Piracy Operations
- MNTF C4ISR (MNTF led by a multinational partner)

INITIAL GAME INSIGHTS

1. Understanding Seabasing: All partners – U.S., multinational and host nation – need to develop a thorough understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the Seabasing concept. Chief among the concerns were optimizing the footprint ashore, leveraging Seabasing capabilities, using the sea base's inherent scalability and flexibility to surge or contract the force, and the delicate balance in determining the tipping point of when and where forces are best employed from the sea base and when they should be postured ashore.

2. Seabasing in Relation to Security Force Assistance: Participants focused on the potential role of the sea base as an enabler to FID-COIN operations, which includes Security Force Assistance (SFA). During the war game, the sea base served as an enabler

in anti-access environments, supported all Joint warfighting functions, and enabled operations among all partners in notional JTF/JIATF/MNTFs

3. Interoperability: Participants revisited an ongoing issue left over from *EW08* – the inherent interoperability and planning challenges faced by all partners of a sea based operation. Many coalition partners are prevented from fully participating due to technological difficulties (i.e. incompatible sea platforms to transfer equipment, U.S. ships using C4ISR architectures that outpace partner nations, etc.). Measures must also be taken to deepen participation by non-DoD U.S. government agencies and nongovernmental organizations.

4. Unique Considerations and Capabilities: Seabasing possesses unique characteristics and considerations in the conduct of FID-COIN. Such areas include force protection, maritime security, the detachment of the sea base from day-to-day operations ashore, the sea base's ability to use the sea as maneuver space, and the ability to optimize footprint ashore.

5. FID-COIN JIC ... or just "FID JIC"?: Participants examining the FID-COIN Joint concept notably recommended that the "COIN" portion of the FID-COIN JIC be eliminated, as well as the importance of putting a host nation face to the operation, and working "by, with, and through" the host nation to the greatest extent possible. Aligning US national interests with host nations interests and objectives was emphasized in both scenarios during *EW09*.

WAY FORWARD

Intensify Visibility for Seabasing among COCOMs

If sea basing will be a viable capability in the future, it must receive a stronger interest from the Combatant Commands. Seabasing is often viewed as an alternative to landbasing. This infers that Seabasing is a less desired course of action, when it should be considered an equal option as part of a network of sea and land bases tailored to meet specific requirements. Two very important opportunities for publicizing Seabasing exist – the Joint Operating Environment (JOE) and Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). Joint Seabasing should be linked to the five challenges in the Capstone Concept.

FID and COIN Enabler

Persistent littoral presence through a sea base is very effective in building partner capacities. Seabasing can mitigate all forms of access challenges: military, political, and geographic. Persistence is the key to successful long-term FID operations. The scalability and flexibility of a sea base are also enabling factors for prolonged operations. The planning for Seabasing in training exercises is important to keep in mind and joint forces must integrate Seabasing into current training programs.

Joint Seabasing CONOPS updates

The current concept of operations focuses primarily on Major Combat Operations and COIN. CONOPS updates should include FID due to its importance and increasing likelihood of occurrence.

Interoperability and Partnering

More input is needed from non-DoD U.S. government agencies and multinational partners to determine interoperability requirements.

- Joint and multinational forces must standardize TTPs to optimize interoperability.
- Formalize Defense/State/USG relationships to avoid the need to draft time-consuming MOAs/MOUs at the onset of a crisis.
- Share developing CONOPS—habitualize communications with all partners as Seabasing concepts and platforms are developed
- Use common sense to facilitate multinational and host nation intelligence sharing (Classification of intelligence products for wider, more timely distribution)
- Support Joint/Combined Exercises
- Create steady-state Seabasing CONOPS at the COCOM level
- Combined exercises in peacetime enable stronger multinational and interagency partnerships during a time of crisis

FID/COIN Joint Concept

Diplomatic input, as well as the host nation's economic and military capabilities must be synchronized with U.S. and coalition partners. This could be facilitated through security and assistance efforts and through Country Teams leveraging enduring personal relationships with host nation authorities.

- Develop the capability to visualize the FID operational environment
- Refine how GFP and SOF are optimally used in FID
- Prevention: Address problems early, build relationships, utilize the expertise of regional allies and appropriate interagency organizations, and leverage the sea base to provide support to interagency missions as required.

EXECUTIVE SEMINAR INSIGHTS


Expeditionary Warrior 2009 concluded with a senior leader executive seminar to brief and discuss key insights and takeaways from the event. In attendance were the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Other attendees were primarily active duty flag officers, allied defense and military attachés, as well as senior civilian officials from the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

The following graphics are taken from the presentation given at the Executive Seminar and outline important steps that must be taken to further enhance the understanding and utility of the Seabasing Concept, specifically in the context of Foreign Internal Defense and Counterinsurgency.

This slide highlights four primary focus areas that must be further examined.




The following slides provide elaboration in each of the four *EW09* Way Ahead topic areas.



Understanding the Capability

Joint Seabasing


- Integrate into JPME
 - Ingrain it into lexicon of future leaders– especially the sea services
 - Educate peers in joint venues
- Relate Seabasing concept to the JOE and CCJO
 - Connect it to the five challenges in the Capstone concept
- Provide seabasing options to meet CDR requirements
 - Seabasing should be considered a peer to land basing– part of a network of sea and land bases tailored and optimized to fit mission requirements
 - Can be scaled up or down
 - Can be much more than just an ESG or MEU
 - To achieve seabasing's highest utility requires planners to harness its flexibility



FID/COIN Enabler

Joint Seabasing


- Increased littoral presence
 - Provides persistent presence in anti-access environments
 - Geographic
 - Political
 - Military
- Planning factors to leverage seabasing
 - Allows commanders greater flexibility to deal with limits on number of personnel ashore
 - Scalability for spectrum of operations: HA/DR, FID, COIN
- Update the joint seabasing CONOPS for FID



Interoperability and Partnering

Joint Seabasing

- Determine IA & MN requirements
 - Compatibility of C4ISR architectures, sea-based platforms, commercial shipping
 - Must standardize TTPs
- Partner development
 - Formalize Defense/State/USG relationships to avoid the need to draft time-consuming MOAs/MOUs at the onset of a crisis.
 - Share developing CONOPS, habitualize communication with all partners
 - Use common sense to facilitate MN, HN intelligence sharing
 - Classification of intel products for wider, more timely dissemination
- Support Joint/Combined exercises
 - Create steady state CONOPS at COCOM level
 - Joint, multinational, and interagency exercises in peacetime enable stronger partnerships during war



FID/COIN Joint Concept

Joint Seabasing

- Develop capability to visualize the FID operational environment
 - Refine how GPF, SOF to be used in FID environment
 - Prevention: Address problems early, build relationships
 - Leverage expertise of:
 - Regional allies
 - Non-DOD, Interagency, NGO, PVO
 - DOD support to IA-led efforts as required
 - Logistics
 - Force Protection
 - C2
- Enhance security assistance training and education
 - Persistent engagement
- Must match near-peer competitors who are conducting influence operations around the world – just like the U.S.

PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS

Department of Defense

USMC

- MCCDC, HQMC, MARFORCOM, MARFORPAC, MARFOREUR/AF, MCIA

USA

- HQDA, ARCIC, AMED, TRADOC

USN

- OPNAV, C2F, NWDC, NECC

USCG

- HQ

USAF

- A5R-J, A5R-Q, A8XC

JFCOM

- J9

SOCOM

- SPECWARCOM, AFSOC, MARSOC

TRANSCOM

- Military Sealift Command

JOINT STAFF

- J7, JCISFA

OSD

- USD (AT&L)

Department of State

- GPOI

Academia/Think Tanks

- Naval War College
- Army War College/Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)

Other Nations

- NATO HQ SACT
- Great Britain
- Australia
- New Zealand
- Netherlands
- Sweden
- Canada
- Germany
- France
- Spain
- Singapore
- Japan
- Italy
- Portugal
- Korea

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